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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
MURRAY CITY, A Municipal
Corporation of the State
of Utah,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

Case No.

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
MURRAY CITY SCHOOL
DISTRICT, a
Municipal Corporation of the
State of Utah,

10060

DefendJant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ST~TEMENT

OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to recover delinquent sewer
serYice charges. The defendant counterclaimed seeking a declaratory judgment that it was exempt from
the payment of the charges.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COUR·T
The case was tried to the court. From a judgment for the plaintiff, defendant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and
judgment in its favor as a matter of law that it
1
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is exempt by law from the payment of sewer service
charges.
STATEMEN'T OF FACTS
In this case appellant and respondent in the
lower court stipulated to the following agreed Statement of Facts:
'~The

plaintiff is a municipal corporation and
'a second class city owning and operating a sewer
system within its corporate limits. Defendant is a
body corpor!ate with its boundaries coinciding with
those of the plain tiff. Prior to September, 19'52, the
plaintiff's sewer system served only approximately
one-third of the city'·s homes and businesses. Plaintiff had no treatment plant, but treated the sewage
in city owned septic tanks. On September 5, 1962,
the electors of the city a:t 'a special election authorized the issu:ance of $1,300,000 of water and sewer
revenue bonds to provide for the construction of extensions and improvements to the city's water plant
and sewer system. The sewer system was thereafter
greatly expanded to serve most of the city's dwelTings and commercial buildings, and a sewage treatment plant was constructed to treat sewage collected from the entire system.
After the system was extended, persons making connections thereto were charged a connection
fee in accordance with a schedule adopted by city
ordinance (See Section 3 of Ordinance 56 as amended for the connection fees being currently charged)·
2
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(R. 6) Persons who were alr~ady connected to the
system paid no such fee, 'but new and old connectors
alike were and are presently required 'to pay a
monthly service charge, the current rates be'ing
shown in Section 2 of Ordinance 56 as ·amended.
(R. 6) Defendant now has 10 school buildings and
one administrative building connected to the plaintiff's sewer system. The defendant paid 'the monthly
service charge of five cents per child until the Attorney General of Utah 'in an opinion issued on or
about November 8, 1960, ruled that the Sta:te of
Utah was not ·obligated to pay fees for connecting
a State owned building to a municipal sewer system.
Upon the authority of that opinion the defendant
refused to pay for the service charges and connection fees, ·and the plaintiff brought suit to recover
all delinquent chlarges.
The service charges and connection fees collected by the plaintiff are placed in a 'separate fund
and used for the payment of operation and maintenance costs and the payment of principal and interest falling due on the revenue bonds issued to
finance construction of the extension to the system
in 1952. The balance remaining after the payment
of those costs ha:s 'been used in recent years to help
finance capital improvements to the system, including expansion of the capacity of the treatment plant.
However, in some former years the balance in the
fund at the end of the year was transferred to the
general fund of the city.
3
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A copy of the plaintiff's ordinance (#50)
authorizing issuance of revenue bonds to defray the
costs of extending the city's sewer and water system is made part of this statement of facts. Also,
the pleadings of the parties hereto are incorporated
herein and made part of this statement of facts."
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE SEWER SERVICE CHARGES I MPOSED BY
THE PLAINTIFF ARE "TAXES" OR "LOCA'L ASSESSMEN'TS", WHICH THE DEFENDANT SCHOOL DISTRICT IS EXEMPT FROM PAYING UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES OF THE STATE OF
UTAH.
1

1

Art. XIII, Sec. ·2 of the Constitution of Utah
provides in part :

"* * * The property of the state, counties,
cities, towns, school districts, municipal corporations and public libraries, lots with the
buildings thereon used exclusively for either
religious worship or charitable purposes, and
places of burial not held or used for private or
corporate benefit, shall be exempt from taxation. * * *" (Italics added)
Implementing the :above Constitutional provision, the Legi'slature has provided in Sec. 59-2-1,
U.C.A. 1953 as follows:
"The property of the United States, of ~his
state, counties, cities, towns, school distn~ts,
municipal corporations an.d public librar.Ies,
lots with the buildings thereon used exclusively for either religious worship or charitable
4
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purposes, a~d places of burial not _held or
used for private or corporate benefit, shall
be exempt from taxation. * * *" (Italics
added)
Again, in Sec. 53-4-12, U.C.A. 1953, the Legislature reiterated that school districts are exempt
from taxation of any nature:
"All property real and personal held by 1any
board of education shall be exempt from general and special taxation, and from all local
assessments for any purpose, 'and no such
property shall be taken in any manner for
debt."
The sewer service charges imposed by the pl'aintiff city against the defendant board of education
are "taxes" or "local 1assessments" within the meaning of the above statutory and constitutional prodsions. So held this court in 1910 in the case of State
c.r 1·el. Board of Education of Salt Lake City v. McGonagle, 38 Utah 277, 11~2 Pac. 401. In that case
Salt Lake City extended 'and constructed a public
sewer along one of its public streets. In order to defray the abutters' portion of the costs and expenses
thereof, it levied an assessment or tax on the lands
abutting the street along which the sewer was constructed. The Board of Education of Salt Lake City
owned land abutting that street which was used for
school purposes, and upon which a school building
was maintained by it. The City levied a tax or
assessment against the land of the Board amounting
to S98.00. An ordinance of Salt :Uake City provided
that whenever property had been previously assessed
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for a sewer or a sewer extension, and any portion
of such assessment remained due and delinquent
a:t the time of an application for a permit for a connection, no permit should be issued until such delinquent assessment was paid.
The Board made application 'to the City Engineer for a sewer connection to its property, and
m!ade payment of all the required fees. The Engineer, however, refused to issue the Board a permit
to connect because it had not paid the special assessment levied against the school property sought to
be connected with the sewer system.
This court issued a writ of mandamus requiring the Engineer to grant the permit for the connection, and held that under Section 1933 Comp.
IJaws 1907 (Now Sec. 53-4-12, U.C.A. 1953, 'set
out 'above) the assessment made by the City against
the Board's property was void.
In that case the City further contended that
even though the assessment was void, it could lawfully make a reasonable charge for the connection
to its sewer by the Board. This Court rejected that
argument stating:
"It, however, i's urged, that though the property was exempt and the assessment invalid
still, the city being the owner of the sewer,
could lawfully impose the payment of areason!able charge before it was required to permit the board to connect with or use the sewer,
and that the payment of ninety-eight dollars,
6
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the amount of the assessment, by the board
for the use of the sewer was a reasonable
charge. The legislature has seen fit to exempt
~11 property of the board, 'both real and personal, from special taxation and all ·local assessments, for any purpose. Since the property was not subject to the assessment, and the
levy for that reason invalid land the assessment unenforceable, to then permit the municipality to impose as a condi'tion of tapping
and making a connection with the public
sewer the payment of 1a charge for the use of
the sewer, is to allow the municipality to do
indirectly what it cannot do directly. ( Btate
ev rei. Dunner v. Graydon, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. R.
634; Meyler v. Meadville, 2'3 Pa. Co. Ct. R.
119.)"
In the case now before the court, it is true, no
special assessment was made by ·Murray City !against
the property of the defendant School Board. The
sewers were financed instead by revenue bonds
which are paid by the conn~tion fees and monthly
sewer service charges paid by users of the system.
However, under holding of the McGonagle case,
:\Iurray City should not be allowed by the use of
service charges to do indirectly that which they
could not do directly by the use of a local assessment
against the School Board's property. This court
wisely struck down in the McGonagle case all attempts to eX!act connection fees from the 'School
Board regardless of the form or name of the "charge"
- whether called a "tax" by the city or whether
called a "reasonable charge" for the use of the sys7
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tern. 'This court looked beyond the form to the substance. It should do so again in the ins·tant case,
and strike 'down the attempt of Murray City to
exact "charges" which are tantamount to '~taxes"
or '''local'assessments''.
While the McGonagle case i·s conclusive authority for the exemption of the defendant School Board
from the payment of sewer service charges imposed
by the plaintiff City, it is helpful and interesting
to examine cases from other jurisdictions where
this question ha's ari'sen. In the Opinion of the Justices, 93 N. H. 478, 39 A. 2d 7'6'5, (1944) the Court
advised the Governor of New H·ampshire that it
would be permissable and Lawful for the State to
pay the City of Concord service charges.,for the use
of a City owned sewer serving the State House and
other ·state-owned buildings. However, this advice
was given by the court only because ( 1) connection
to the sewer system was optional with the State
and ('2) because the chlarges collected could only be
used for the construction, maintenance and operation of the system, and could not be used for the
payment of the general expense'S of the City. (As
will be later noted, both these elements are lacking
in the case now before this court).
The New Hampshire court quoted with approval :and placed strong reliance on the following excerpt from Sec. 6 of Page & Jones', "TAXATION
BY ASSESSMENT":
"A number of cases exist which present facts
8
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very much like those of a regular local assessment, but which differ from the l~ocal assessment in one essential fact. This essential difference is that in these case's it is optional
with the party so charged to incur the liability
by acceptance of the benefit for which the
charge is made, or to ·abstain from such benefit and thus be free from liability. Common
examples of this 'are ordinances providing for
furnishing water to part or 'all of the City
to those who wish to take it, at 1a price fixed
by ordinance, where the persons who make use
of the water are charged an amount, sometimes estimated a:t a lump sum, and sometimes based upon the amount consumed.
Whichever form the charge mlay assume, the
person who makes use of such commodity i's
under no legal obligation to do so, and does
so voluntarily. Such a statute does not impose
an assessment in the proper ·sen'se of the term,
though the charge is often spoken of as a
"tax". The transaction relai'ly amounts to an
offer by the municipal corporation and an
acceptance by the party who takes the water,
thus forming a con tract. The transaction then
is substantially a contract sale.

* * * Another form of a charge which is in
substance a contract is to be found where a
municipality, under authority conferred by
statute, imposes a charge upon property owners who connect their land with a sewer system constructed by the city, the owner being
free to avoid liability by refraining from
making such connection. Such charges may
be a fixed sum for the privilege of such connection, or it may be a charge based upon
the amount of sewerage discharged from the
9
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premises into the sewer. Such a ch arge is not
ordinarily regarded as a loc'al assessmen't".
(Italics added)
1

The necessary implication in the Opinion of the
Justices was that if the State were compelled to
connect its building to the City sewer system, or
if the charges could find the'ir way into the general
funds of 'the City, the charges would then be regarded as loeal assessments which the State was
exempt from paying.
In the case before the court, the balance remaining at the end of the year in the fund in which
connection fees and service charges 'are placed can
be and has been transferred to the general fund of
the Crty. (R. 5) Under Sec. 11 of Ordinance #50
(page 10 of Ordinance attached ·to Stipulation of
Facts) all owners of improved property within two
hundred ( 200) feet of the 'sewer line are compelled
to connect and pay the connection fee and monthly
service charges. Thus the 'two elements relied upon
by the New Hampshire court in gr!anting permissiun for payment of service charges are clearly lacking iri the case before the court.
It should 'be noted that under Ordinance #56
of Murray City ( R. 6) sewer service charges are
imposed when there are structures which can be
served by the sewer, irrespective of whether the
structures are actUJally connected to the sewer. "Service charges" imposed under those circumstances
are in reality "taxes", held the Supreme Court of
10
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Pennsylvania in the case of In re Petition of City
of Philadelphia, 340 Pa. 17, 16 A. 2d 32. There the
court considered annual sewer rents or charges imposed by the City of Philadelphia against owners of
property abutting a sewer line irrespective of
whether the property was connected 'to the system.
The court pointed out that when connection to a
se\ver system is voluntarily made by one seeking
service, the connector by using the facility 'impliedly
contracts and a:grees to pay the rates, and that his
obligation to m:ake payment rests upon contra~t
rather than upon any exercise of the taxing power.
But, said the court:
"There i·s, however, a clear distinction to be
drawn between rents paid for ·actual use of
municipally owned utility facilities and charges such ~as the city here seeks to impose. * * *"
"* * * it is manifest that the charges here in
questi'on cannot be sll'stained on the theory
by which sewer and water rentals have heretofore been upheld by this court ·and the Superior Court in cases already referred to ;
the burden of this charge being imposed in
invitum, (·against one not !assenting) no implied assent to its payment can possibly he
deduced."
"* * * Being imposed without any regard
\vhatever to the extent or value of the use
made of the sewer facility or whether any
use is made, the charge provided for by the
ordinance is, in legal effect, undoubtedly :a
tax, and the obligation to pay it could 'be
created only by the City's exercise of its gen11
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eral taxing powers.'' (Citing cases) (Italics
added)
'Thus it is manifest that Murray City's Ordinance #'56 requiring payment of service charges by
non-connectors as well as by connectors cannot be upheld on any theory other th'an that the charges are
'~taxes" or "local assessments" within the meaning
of Art. XIII, Sec. 2 of our Constitution, and Sections 59-2-1 'and 53-4-12, U.C.A. 1953. 'The wisdom
of this court in the McGonagle case in striking down
all attempts to exact charges regardless of the n1ame
affixed to them is substantiated by the New Hampshire and Pennsylvania cases above discussed.
The operation of :a sewer system by a municipal'i'ty is 1a governmental function. Louisville v.
Barker, 307 Ky. 655, 212 S.W. 2d 122 (1948). If
Murray City is here allowed to impose and collect
a '''service ch'arge" from the Board of Education,
what is to prevent it from imposing and collecting
"service chlarges" for other governmental functions
such as garbage collecting, fire fighting, etc. The
end result could well be that the Board of Education
would wind up paying "service charges" for many
governmental functions. This was the very evil condemned by this court in the McGonagle case, i.e. a
city imposing a "service charge" where it could not
impose a "tax".
It should be stressed in this case that the boundaries of the defendant School District are exactly
the same as those of the plaintiff City. 'The same
12
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taxpayers support the School District and the City.
No taxpayer will suffer any detriment if the School
District is exempted from payment of the service
charges. The exemption will save the School District from having to pay annually several thousand
dollars which may find their way, in part, to the
general coffers of the City.
This court in the case of State v. Salt Lake City
Public Board of Education, 13 Utah 2d 56, 368 P.
2d 468, held that the State Road Commission could
not take by condemn!ation the land of the Salt Lake
City School District without compensating it. 'The
court there noted that the taxpayers of the two
governmental agencies involved were n:ot identical
and implied that if there had been this identity,
the decision of the court might have 'been different.
Regardless of that fact, however, it would seem
that if one state agency cannot condemn the property of another state agency without paying compensation, it neither should be allowed to impose
burdens and charges against it, irrespective of
wb(!ther the burdens and charges are denominated
"taxes" or "service charges".
CONCLUSION
The decision of the lower court that the defendant School District must pay service charges for
the use of the plaintiff's sewer will have far reaching effect if not reversed by this court. If permitted
to stand, it will require the State of Utah to pay
13
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service charges and connection fees on 1all of its
state owned buildings in Salt Lake City and throughout the State, as well as requiring all counties, school
districts, and dther political subdivisions to pay.
This court in the McGonagle case foresaw this problem and wisely struck down all attempts to collect
service charges. Any other result would have emascula:ted our constitutional and statutory provisions exempting the State and its subdivisions from
the payment of "'tJaxes" and Hlocal assessments" of
any na:ture. The exemption granted to school dis1tricts in Sec. 53-4-12, U.C.A. 1953, is broad in that
it encompasses '~taxes" and "local assessments" of
any nature. This court should not narrow the definition of "local assessments".
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARD C. HOWE
5055 South State St.
Murray, Utah
Attorney for Appellant
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